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Since the mid-1980s, monetary policy has contributed to a great moderation of the housing cycle by
responding more proactively to inflation and thereby reducing the boom bust cycle. However, during
the period from 2002 to 2005, the short term interest rate path deviated significantly from what this
two decade experience would suggest is appropriate. A counterfactual simulation with a simple model
of the housing market shows that this deviation may have been a cause of the boom and bust in housing
starts and inflation in the last two years.  Moreover, a significant time series correlation between housing
price inflation and delinquency rates suggests that the poor credit assessments on subprime mortgages
may also have been caused by this deviation.
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John.Taylor@stanford.edu  This paper focuses on the relationship between monetary policy and the recent turmoil in 
the markets for housing, housing finance, and beyond. I begin with a review of the period 
leading up to the crisis.  I then use this review as a basis for discussing the role of monetary 
policy in resolving such crises and preventing future crises. 
 
A Great Moderation of the Housing Cycle 
  When you look back over the past half century in the United States you see a remarkable 
secular change in the housing cycle.  Most importantly, the volatility or average size of the 
fluctuations in residential construction declined. The change occurred in the early 1980s. For 
example, compare two periods, the first before the early 1980s and the second since the 1980s. In 
the earlier period the standard deviation of residential investment relative to trend was around 13 
percent; in the later period it was 5 percent, and this includes the most recent fluctuation which is 
much larger than the average since the early 1980s. Without the current cycle the reduction 
would be even larger. 
  In my view this decline in volatility was largely due to an improved monetary policy, and 
it is closely related to the Great Moderation of the volatility of real GDP and inflation which 
many researchers have attributed to monetary policy.  Compared to the earlier period, monetary 
policy has been much more responsive since the early 1980s to changes in inflation and real 
GDP.  It has also been much more predictable and systematic in its response. This has been 
documented using the Taylor rule, where the response coefficient to inflation has increased from 
less than one to greater than one and where the response coefficient to real output has also 
increased.  These higher and more predictable responses have helped tame inflation and have kept it steadier, thereby reducing the boom-bust cycle and the resulting large swings in interest 
rates that had caused the volatile housing.  
  There are other possible explanations, including the argument that housing became less 
impacted by a given change in the federal funds rate due to securitization and deregulation of 
deposit rates. However, my estimates of the effect of changes in the federal funds rate on housing 
show no evidence of such a shift between these two periods. Moreover, no other explanation that 
I am aware of has the timing so precise. Hence, although this subject will be debated for a long 
time, I think there is convincing evidence that Federal Reserve policy makers were responsible 




  However, a careful review of interest rate decisions shows that in some years they did not 
correspond so closely to such a policy description. During the period from 2003 to 2006 the 
federal funds rate was well below what experience during the previous two decades of good 
economic macroeconomic performance—the Great Moderation—would have predicted.  Policy 
rule guidelines showed this clearly. There have been other periods during the Great Moderation 
where the federal funds rate veered off the typical policy rule responses—in particular during the 
fall of 1998—but this was the biggest deviation, comparable to the turbulent 1970s.  
  Many have argued that these low interest rates—or the provision of large amounts of 
liquidity that they required—helped foster the extraordinary surge in the demand for housing.  
As the Economist recently put it, “By slashing interest rates (by more than the Taylor rule 
prescribed) the Fed encouraged a house-price boom….” With low money market rates, housing 
finance was very cheap and attractive—especially variable rate mortgages with the teasers that 
  2many lenders offered. Housing starts jumped to a 25 year high by the end of 2003 and remained 
high until the sharp decline began in early 2006.  
  The surge in housing demand led to a surge in housing price inflation which had already 
been high since the mid 1990s. The housing inflation rate measured by the OFHEO price index 
reached 10 percent at an annual rate in the fourth quarter of 2004 and remained over 10 percent 
for two years; measured by the Case-Shiller index, housing inflation surpassed 20 percent during 
parts of this period. This jump in housing price inflation then accelerated the demand for housing 
in an upward spiral. With housing prices rising rapidly, delinquency and foreclosure rates on 
sub-prime mortgages also fell, which led to more favorable credit ratings than could ultimately 
be sustained. As the short term interest rate returned to normal levels, housing demand rapidly 
fell bringing down both construction and housing price inflation. Delinquency and foreclosure 
rates then rose sharply, ultimately leading to the meltdown in the subprime market and on all 
securities that were derivative from the subprimes.  
  It is important to address these arguments systematically. There were, of course, good 
reasons stated at the time for the prolonged period of low interest rates, most importantly the risk 
of deflation following the experience of Japan in the mid 1990s.  Nevertheless with the passage 
of time we can better understand the ramifications of this policy, and thereby learn lessons for 
the future.  
 
A Counterfactual Scenario 
  The classic methodology for investigating such questions is a “counterfactual scenario.” 
What would have happened if an alternative path for the federal funds rate were followed? To 
answer this question one needs an economic model that describes how monetary policy—in 
  3particular the federal funds rate—affects housing. Ultimately one needs an international 
econometric model with endogenous (rational) expectations in which residential investment in 
each country is a function of interest rates, including short term and real long term interest rates, 
as in the Taylor (1993) multi-country model for example. For the purposes of this policy panel I 
took a more straightforward approach. I estimated a simple housing starts equation with the 
federal funds rates as the explanatory variable. The equation was estimated with quarterly data 
over the nearly 50 year period from the second quarter of 1959 to the second quarter of 2007. 
The model shows a strong, statistically significant effect of the federal funds rate on housing 
starts which occurs with a lag. The interest rate elasticity is similar to those found in more 
complex models such as Topel and Rosen (1988); the semi-elasticity is about -8.3. (The 
estimated semi-elasticity was -8.9 in the post 1984.1 period and -8.6 in the pre-1984.1 period.)  
  I simulated this model under two assumptions: (1) the federal funds rate follows its actual 
path and (2) the federal funds rate follows a Taylor rule, smoothed to have the 25 basis point 
increment adjustments used by the Fed in recent years.  Figure 1 shows the two paths for the 










2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Counterfactual Federal Funds Rate




  Observe that the actual and the alternative paths depart in the second quarter of 2002 and 
merge again in the third quarter of 2006. I emphasize that this is only one of many ways to carry 
out such a counterfactual exercise. Here I use the CPI as the measure of inflation and assume 
response coefficients of 1.5 and .5 on inflation and real GDP, respectively.  I found that using a 
similar, but unsmoothed, path reported by Poole (2007) gives similar results. It would also be 
possible to bring the counterfactual path all the way down to one percent and then raise it faster 
than the actual path.  The most important alterative would be to simulate the counterfactual with 
a feedback rule rather than this fixed path in which case the interest rate would not have risen all 
the way to 5.25 percent.     
  Figure 2 shows the results of the simulations using the counterfactual scenario in Figure 1 
and compares these with the historical data. The simulations begin in the fourth quarter of 2000; 
during the period when the policy is on the rule, the simulation path tracks historical data on 
housing starts very closely. When the paths depart one sees how the housing boom continued 
  5with the actual interest rates (labeled dynamic simulation), but that there would have been a 
much smaller increase in housing starts with the counterfactual simulation of a higher federal 
funds rate. Hence, a higher federal funds rate path would have avoided much of the housing 





  The analysis also suggests that the reversal of the boom and thereby the resulting market 
turmoil would not have been as sharp, although the model does not predict as abrupt an end to 
the housing boom as in the historical data when the federal funds rate is on the actual path. 
However, such sharp falls frequently occur at the end of booms because of rapid changes in 
housing inflation expectations.  In fact, there is a close interactive relation between housing price 
inflation and housing construction (technically, two-way Granger causality). Placing housing 
inflation directly into the housing starts equation, and adding a simple equation to explain 
  6housing inflation, helps explain more of the decline as shown in Figure 3, but psychological 







Long Term Interest Rates 
  A complicating factor in reviewing this period is that long term interest rates did not 
increase as much when the federal funds rate rose as would be expected from past experience 
during the Great Moderation.  A larger increase in long term rates would clearly have mitigated 
the housing boom even with the actual path of the funds rate. 
  
  7   One of the explanations for this unusual behavior of long term interest rates was that 
global saving was very high driving down real long term interest rates. However, while saving 
rates were high in some countries during this period, the global saving rate was not. According to 
IMF data, global saving was 21 percent of GDP in 2003-2005 compared with 25 percent in early 
1970s.  
  Another explanation for the low long-term interest rates was that they were a direct 
consequence of the large deviation from the typical short-run interest rate responses. Long term 
interest rates respond to changes in expected future short term rates; if the period of low interest 
rates was interpreted as evidence of a change in the response of policy to changes in inflation, 
then these interest rate expectations could have declined because of the policy decisions at the 
short end of the term structure. Indeed, policy rules estimated during the 2003-2005 period show 
a large downward shift in the responsiveness of the federal funds rate to inflation. The 
responsiveness appears to be at least as low as in the late 1960s and 1970s. As discussed in 
Smith and Taylor (2007), this could have led investors to believe that there was a longer run 
change in policy which would have reduced the response of long term interest rates.  A key 
lesson here is that large deviations from business-as-usual policy rules are difficult for market 
participants to deal with and can lead to surprising changes in other responses in the economy.  
 
Delinquency and Foreclosure Rates in the Subprime Market 
  The extraordinary housing inflation during this period is also closely related to the 
problems in the sub-prime mortgage market.  While the low interest rates increased the supply of 
funds to the mortgage market, there is evidence that the high housing inflation led to a marked 
  8reduction in delinquency and foreclosure rates. Figure 4 shows the inverse relationship in the 
case of sub-prime adjustable rate mortgages.   
 
 




Such a relationship is not a new phenomenon as Figure 5 shows.  The delinquency rate in 
Figure 5 covers all of kinds of mortgages (prime/subprime, fixed and adjustable-rate mortgages). 
Regressions controlling for other factors reveal a similar correlation.   
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Figure 5 
 
  Observe, however, that as housing inflation began to fall, the relatively low delinquency 
and foreclosure rates reversed sharply. But before the reversal many mortgages and mortgage 
backed securities were issued with credit ratings that reflected the unusually low delinquency 
rates. Only later were the credit ratings reduced.  Assessing the risk was particularly difficult 
when such mortgages were packaged into securities that combined other types of risk profiles. 
Automatic underwriting programs which look at the cross section of a population to calibrate 
delinquency and foreclosure probabilities could easily have missed the time series effects of the 
change in inflation for newer markets such as subprime adjustable rate mortgages.  Hence, 
people purchased these securities not knowing the risk that they entailed. Pricing these securities 
was difficult with the unusually high inflation rates in the housing markets, but eventually the 
risk premiums adjusted to reflect the reality. For example, the Markit ABX Index of securities 
  10consisting of subprime mortgages securitized during the second half of 2006 has fallen from 
about 82 to 38 since February of this year.   
  A final and very important part of background for the policy discussion concerns the 
spread of the turmoil in the subprime market to other markets.  It appears that much of this 
spread is based on fundamentals, or the perception of fundamentals, rather than the broader type 
of contagion we saw in the 1990s. The indices of option-adjusted spreads of asset-backed 
securities and corporate bonds of comparable ratings (either BBB or A) are shown in Figures 6 
and 7.  The spread between U.S. Treasuries and emerging market debt is shown in Figures 8 and 
9. Clearly economic policies in emerging market countries have improved greatly since the 
1990s and deserving a great deal of the credit are central bankers. 
 
Lessons Learned 
  What are the lessons learned from this review? First, stay with the systematic, 
predictable, principles-based policy that has worked well for most of the Great Moderation 
period. That is, adjust the short term interest rate according to macroeconomic developments in 
inflation and real GDP and be wary of adjustments based on other factors.   
  Second, provide all the funds that banks want to hold at the short end of the market at the 
current policy rate. This accommodates fluctuations in the demand for cash and deposits at the 
central bank and is fully consistent with the first recommendation of not adjusting the target 
interest rate unless the macroeconomic situation changes. This is the open market policy that has 
been used recently, especially on August 9 and 10, and that was used to a much greater degree 
during the days around 9/11. 
 
  11  Following these two principles predictably is the best way to avoid moral hazard and 
convince people that there is no “put” in which the central bank is expected to bail out individual 
investors. If investors understand and believe that the policy is to adjust interest rates only if 
macroeconomic trends change, then they will know that the Fed will do nothing else to help 
them out if their own risky investments turn out to be losers.    If the current slump in the housing 
market, or in the commercial paper market, is causing GDP and/or inflation to fall markedly, 
then a cut in the federal funds interest rate would be fully consistent with these principles.  
  Third, there is more that can be done to make such a policy approach clear. For example, 
the Fed could publish its balance sheet on a daily basis, or at least the “Fed balances” that banks 
hold at the Fed. That way market participants can determine immediately how much of an 
increase in the demand for such balances is being accommodated by the Fed. The information 
that is currently posted on the size of repos is not sufficient to figure out the cash demand in the 
money markets because of other factors affecting the supply.  The information provided about 
daily “Fed balances” in the 2001 report on open market operations (Kos (2002), pp. 21-25) is an 
example of the usefulness of such data during periods of market turbulence. Publishing daily 
data in real time would increase clarity and transparency.     
  Fourth, there are other direct actions that should be undertaken in the current situation 
including insisting on accountability for mortgage originators and improving the supervision of 
“off-balance” sheet operations such as conduits. If there are plans for banks to take on some of 
the asset backed commercial paper and pull off some of the questionable backing, then this could 
be made more transparent as well.   
 
  12  Finally, on the international dimension, as I mentioned earlier, emerging market countries 
with their large reserves and other improvements in policy have not been affected very much by 
the current crisis. Fortunately the IMF has not had to provide funds and we can hope that this 
relatively fortunate situation continues. If the situation changes I hope that the IMF adheres to its 
new Exceptional Access Framework which provides the same kind of predictability to its lending 
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Residential Mortgage Credit Card Auto Corporate  Commercial Mortgage  
Source: Merrill Lynch 
Figure 6 
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Figure 7 
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Figure 9 
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